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ABSTRACT
Monetary Policy Rules, Asset Prices and Exchange Rates*
We examine empirically whether asset prices and exchange rates may be
admitted into a standard interest rate rule, using data for the US, the UK and
Japan since 1979. Asset prices and exchange rates can be employed as
information variables for a standard `Taylor-type’ rule or as arguments in an
augmented interest rate rule. Our empirical evidence, based on measures of
the output gap proxied by marginal costs calculations, suggests that monetary
policy-makers may use asset prices and exchange rates not only as part of
their information set for setting interest rates, but also to set interest rates to
offset deviations of asset prices or exchange rates from their equilibrium
levels. These results are open to several alternative interpretations.
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
It has become commonplace to characterize monetary policy using an interest
rate rule (see Taylor, 1993, 1999, 2001). Such an interest rate rule relates the
setting of short-term money market rates to the evolution of two key variables,
price inflation and the output gap. A considerable and influential research
effort has been directed at establishing to what extent this kind of rule can
explain the dynamics of policy rates in major industrialized countries (see
Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998, 2000). The main virtue of this ‘Taylor’ rule is
its simplicity but therein lies a vice, as there is controversy as to whether such
a rule can be an adequate representation of a process as complex as that of
monetary policy.
Accordingly, an important issue for central banks in recent years, for example,
has been what weight to place on asset prices in setting interest rates. In
periods of growing optimism, which may be associated with extended periods
of economic expansion, asset prices may climb to unsustainable levels even if
the path of likely returns (from, say, productivity gains or earnings growth) is
unchanged (Shiller, 2000). The possibility of a sharp correction in asset prices
may then leave the real economy unduly fragile and this vulnerability may
become an issue for monetary policy-makers. Furthermore, macroeconomic
imbalances may be exacerbated by the possibility that monetary policy
makers may explicitly target asset prices. A useful dichotomy is whether asset
prices movements are a concern for central banks only because they contain
information about future inflation – they are used as information variables - or
whether they should be seen as variables to which central banks should react
in addition to expected inflation and possibly the output gap. While some
authors claim that including stock prices in the central bank’s policy rule may
be optimal (e.g. Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani, 2000; Bordo and
Jeanne, 2002) and that central banks react significantly to stock market
movements by changing the short-term interest rate (e.g. Rigobon and Sack,
2003), other studies argue that central banks should not respond directly to
asset prices (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001).
Furthermore, in an open economy, the exchange rate is both a source of
extraneous shocks and a mechanism for adjusting to fundamentals’ shocks
and thus monetary policy choices are not independent of exchange rate
dynamics. Some recent contributions argue that central banks may respond to
the exchange rate, and this is particularly relevant in the case of small open
economies (see Taylor, 2001). At the empirical level, some researchers
provide evidence that exchange rates are statistically significant in interest
rates rules depicting the reaction functions of several major central banks (e.g.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998).
In this paper we extend this analysis to consider jointly the role of asset prices
and exchange rates in the interest rate rule in order to assess whether three
major central banks – the US Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of England and
the Bank of Japan – have responded to asset prices and exchange rates
during the last couple of decades or so or whether they have used asset
prices and exchange rates only as information variables that can help predict
future inflation or output. In our study we allow asset prices and exchange
rates to act both as information variables and as monetary policy targets,
which enables us to investigate in an augmented interest rate rule whether
and how central banks react to asset prices and exchange rates disequilibria.
In this Paper we investigate a general monetary policy rule comprising
inflation and the output gap as well as asset prices and exchange rates in a
unified framework, while examining the role of alternative measures of real
marginal costs and the output gap. Using quarterly data since 1979 for the
US, the UK and Japan we confirm the main results of the empirical literature
on forward-looking monetary policy rules. We also show that our baseline
estimation including asset prices, exchange rates and an adjusted labour
share as the appropriate proxy for the output gap yields significant parameter
estimates for all the arguments in the interest rate rule of the US and the UK,
and for all the arguments except asset prices in the case of Japan. These
results are open to several alternative interpretations, which we discuss in the
Paper.
1 Introduction
It has become commonplace to characterize monetary policy as the minimization of ineﬃcient
economic fluctuations via the implementation of an interest rate rule (see Taylor, 1993, 1999, 2001).
Such an interest rate rule relates the setting of short-term money market rates to the evolution of
two key state variables, price inflation and the output gap. A considerable and influential research
eﬀort has been directed at establishing to what extent this kind of rule can explain the dynamics
of policy rates in major industrialized countries (see, inter alia, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998,
2000, and the references therein). The main virtue of this ‘Taylor’ rule is its simplicity but therein
lies a vice, as there is controversy as to whether such a rule can be an adequate representation of
a process as complex as that of monetary policy.
Accordingly, an important issue for central banks in recent years, for example, has been what
weight to place on asset prices in setting interest rates (see, for example, Greenspan, 1999; Batini
and Nelson, 2000; Goodhart, 2000; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002). In periods of growing optimism,
which may be associated with extended periods of economic expansion, asset prices may climb to
unsustainable levels even if the path of likely returns (from, say, productivity gains or earnings
growth) is unchanged (Shiller, 2000). The possibility of a sharp correction in asset prices may then
leave the real economy unduly fragile and this vulnerability may become an issue for monetary
policy makers. Furthermore, macroeconomic imbalances may be exacerbated by the possibility
that monetary policy makers may explicitly target asset prices. A useful dichotomy is whether
asset prices movements are a concern for central banks only because they contain information
about future inflation - they are used as information variables - or whether they should be seen
as variables to which central banks should react in addition to expected inflation and possibly the
output gap. While some authors claim that including stock prices in the central bank’s policy rule
may be optimal (e.g. Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani, 2000; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002)
and that central banks react significantly to stock market movements by changing the short-term
interest rate (e.g. Rigobon and Sack, 2003), other studies argue that central banks should not
respond directly to asset prices (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001).1
1For an extensive discussion of the issues related to the role of asset prices in designing macroeconomic policy, see
the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (May 2000, Chapter 3, “Asset Prices and the Business
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Furthermore, in an open economy, the exchange rate is both a source of extraneous shocks
and a mechanism for adjusting to fundamentals’ shocks and thus monetary policy choices are not
independent of exchange rate dynamics. Some recent contributions argue that central banks may
respond to the exchange rate, and this is particularly relevant in the case of small open economies
(see, inter alia, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995; Taylor, 2001). At the empirical level, some researchers
provide evidence that exchange rates are statistically significant in interest rates rules depicting
the reaction functions of several major central banks (e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998).
In this paper we extend this analysis to consider jointly the role of asset prices and exchange
rates in the interest rate rule in order to assess whether three major central banks - the US Federal
Reserve Bank, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan - have responded to asset prices and
exchange rates during the last couple of decades or so or whether they have used asset prices and
exchange rates only as information variables that can help predict future inflation or output. In
our study we allow asset prices and exchange rates to act both as information variables and as
monetary policy targets, which enables us to investigate in an augmented interest rate rule whether
and how central banks react to asset prices and exchange rates disequilibria.
A subsidiary issue is the extent to which the output gap is correctly measured. In the empirical
literature on central banks’ reaction functions, the output gap has generally been measured by
detrending output using deterministic trends (e.g. Taylor, 1993; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998,
2000) or smoothed trends representing the equilibrium level of output consistent with perfectly
flexible prices (see, inter alia, Kozicki, 1999, and the references therein). In practice, however, the
eﬃcient level of output may behave quite diﬀerently in response to real shocks such that potential
output may not follow a smooth trend. As a result the output-gap measure that is relevant for
monetary policy purposes may be diﬀerent from the one captured by detrended output (Woodford,
2001). Recently, several contributions (e.g. Gali and Gertler, 1999; Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido,
2001) have shown that, under certain restrictions on technology and labor market structure within
a local neighborhood of the steady state, real marginal costs are directly related to the output gap.
In this paper we tie together these diﬀerent, albeit related, strands of the literature in that we
investigate a very general monetary policy rule comprising inflation and the output gap as well as
Cycle”).
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asset prices and exchange rates in an unified framework, while examining the role of alternative
measures of real marginal costs and the output gap. Using quarterly data since 1979 for the
US, the UK and Japan we confirm the main results of the empirical literature on forward-looking
monetary policy rules. However, we also show that our baseline estimation including asset prices,
exchange rates and an adjusted labor share as the appropriate proxy for the output gap yields
significant parameter estimates for all the arguments in the interest rate rule of the US and the
UK, and for all the arguments except asset prices in the case of Japan. These results are open to
several alternative interpretations, which we discuss below.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we discuss a general empirical
framework for forward-looking monetary policy rules emphasizing the role of output-gap measures
as well as asset prices and exchange rates dynamics. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4
we report and discuss our empirical results. A final section concludes.
2 Monetary policy rule specification
In this section we briefly review the standard framework of analysis of forward-looking interest
rate (or Taylor) rules, which we then generalize to an interest rate rule which explicitly allows for
asset prices and exchange rates to act both as information variables and monetary policy targets.
Finally, we also discuss a subsidiary issue relating to the calculation of the proxy of the output
gap used in interest rate rules.
2.1 Forward-looking Taylor rules
Following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998, 1999, 2000), assume that within each operating period
the central bank has a target for the nominal short-term interest rate, r∗t which is a function of the
state of the economy represented by the gaps between expected inflation and output from their
respective targets:
r∗t = r
∗ + β [E (πt+kπ |Ωt)− π∗] + γ
£
E
¡
xt+ky |Ωt
¢¤
, (1)
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where r∗ is the desired nominal interest rate when both inflation and output are at their target
levels; E (πt+kπ |Ωt) and E
¡
xt+ky |Ωt
¢
denote the expectations of inflation at time t+ kπ and the
output gap at time t + ky; π∗ is the level of inflation (implicitly or explicitly) targeted by the
central bank; the output gap xt+ky ≡ yt+ky − y∗t+ky , where y is output and y
∗ if the eﬃcient level
of output.2
Consider the implied target for the ex ante real interest rate.3 Central banks will pursue
monetary policy aimed at stabilizing inflation if the parameter β > 1, while rules characterized by
β ≤ 1 will tend to be destabilizing. Clearly, the parameter γ is consistent with stabilizing output
directly only if γ > 0 (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000).
Equation (1) may be, however, too restrictive to describe the behavior of short term rates. As
documented in earlier contributions (e.g. Goodfriend, 1987), central banks may operate smoothing
changes in interest rates for diﬀerent reasons (e.g. eﬀects on capital markets, loss of reputation,
private consensus building). In order to account for this behavior we can specify equation (1)
assuming that the current short-term interest rate rt adjusts to the target rate r∗t according to
a partial adjustment mechanism of the form rt = [1− ρ (1)] r∗t + ρ (L) rt−1 + υt, where ρ (L) is
an n−lag polynomial, L is the lag operator and υt is a zero-mean exogenous interest rate shock.
Allowing for smoothing in the above fashion in equation (1) results in an interest rate rule where in
each period central banks act on the short term interest rate reducing the gap between the current
target rate and its past value:
rt = α+ λπt+kπ + ϑxt+ky + ρ (L) rt−1 + εt, (2)
where we have eliminated the unobserved conditional expectations by rewriting equation (1) in
terms of realized variables; α = [1− ρ (1)] (r∗ − βπ∗); λ = [1− ρ (1)]β; ϑ = [1− ρ (1)] γ; and the
error term εt = υt − [1− ρ (1)]
©
β [πt+kπ −E (πt+kπ |Ωt)] + γ
£
xt+ky −E
¡
xt+ky |Ωt
¢¤ª
is the sum
of a zero-mean exogenous shock and a linear combination of forecast errors which are orthogonal
to the variables considered in the information set Ωt. Given estimates of the parameters in the
2This rule can also be obtained in a framework where the central bank faces a quadratic loss function over
inflation and output (see, inter alia, Svensson, 1997; Bernanke and Woodford, 1997, and the references therein).
3The ex ante real interest rate can be obtained as rr∗t = rt −E (πt+kπ |Ωt). Substituting this into equation (1)
we get that rr∗t = rr
∗ + (β − 1) [E (πt+kπ |Ωt)− π∗] + γ
h
E
³
xt+ky |Ωt
´i
, where rr∗ = r∗ − π∗.
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forward-looking Taylor rule (2), one can therefore recover the implied estimates of β and γ.
2.2 Augmenting forward-looking Taylor rules with asset prices and
exchange rates
Equation (2) does not explicitly consider the role of asset prices and exchange rates as monetary
policy targets (or instruments). It is under debate whether and how asset prices and exchange
rates should be taken into account in formulating monetary policy (see Taylor, 2001; Clarida, 2001).
While asset prices may be used as indicator variables, in the last decade or so several major central
banks have started taking into consideration the apparent increase in financial instability, of which
one important dimension is represented by the volatility of asset prices. In fact, as recorded
in several contributions, asset booms and busts have been important factors in macroeconomic
fluctuations in both industrial and developing countries (see, for example, Borio, Kennedy and
Prowse, 1994). Similar arguments apply to the role of exchange rates in central banks’ reaction
functions (e.g. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998; Taylor, 2001).
Thus, we consider a baseline equation - which may be termed augmented Taylor rule - of the
form:
rt = a+ λπt+kπ + ϑxt+ky + χet−1 + κst−1 + ρ (L) rt−1 + εt, (3)
where et−1 and st−1 denote the lagged real exchange rate and stock price; a =
[1− ρ (1)] (r∗ − βπ∗ − φs∗ − δe∗), where s∗ and e∗ denote the equilibrium levels of asset
prices and exchange rates respectively; λ = [1− ρ (1)]β; ϑ = [1− ρ (1)] γ; χ =
[1− ρ (1)] δ and κ = [1− ρ (1)]φ, where δ and φ are the parameters determining the
central bank’s response to exchange rates and asset prices disequilibria; and εt = υt −
[1− ρ (1)]
©
β [πt+kπ −E (πt+kπ |Ωt)] + γ
£
xt+ky −E
¡
xt+ky |Ωt
¢¤ª
. Equation (3) generalizes the
standard forward-looking Taylor rule to account for the possibility that both asset prices and
exchange rates enter the interest rate rule. Clearly, equation (3) nests not only the standard
forward-looking Taylor rule estimated, for example, by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), but also
its variants which allow only for either exchange rates (e.g. Taylor, 2001) or asset prices (e.g.
Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002) respectively.
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Let zt denote a vector of instruments comprising the central bank’s information set at the
time the instrument rate rt is chosen (i.e. zt ∈ Ωt). Equation (3) implies a set of orthogonality
conditions because the elements of zt include lagged variables that help forecast inflation, output
as well as contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the interest rate shock υt. More
formally, since E [εt|zt] = 0:
E
£
rt − a− λπt+kπ − ϑxt+ky − χet−1 − κst−1 − ρ (L) rt−1|zt
¤
= 0. (4)
This set of orthogonality conditions is the basis of the estimation of the parameter vector
{β, γ, φ, δ, ρ} , using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), with an optimal weighting
matrix that accounts for possible serial correlation in εt. To the extent that the dimension of the
vector zt exceeds the number of parameters being estimated, equation (3) implies overidentifying
restrictions that can be tested to assess the validity of the set of instruments used (Hansen, 1982).
The results of this test can be interpreted as follows: under the null hypothesis the central bank
adjusts the interest rate according to equation (3), with the expectations of future inflation and the
output gap based on the relevant information available to policy makers at time t. Under general
assumptions this implies that there exists a set of parameters
neβ, eγ, eφ,eδ,eρo such that the residuals
obtained from estimating (3) are orthogonal to the information set Ωt. Under the alternative
hypothesis the violation of the orthogonality conditions will lead to the statistical rejection of the
model.
In line with some recent empirical literature, we assume that the real exchange rate follows a
persistent but stationary process, implying that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in the long
run (see the review of Sarno and Taylor, 2002 and the references therein). The real exchange rate
equilibrium level can then be captured by a constant included in the intercept term of the reaction
function so that eﬀectively the exchange rate variable entering (3) is the lagged deviation from
PPP. Indeed, it is often assumed in international macroeconomic models that the instrument rate
is aﬀected by past values of exchange rates disequilibria (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1995; Taylor,
2001; Hunt and Rebucci, 2003). Defining the real exchange rate as the domestic price of foreign
currency, the resulting monetary policy rule acts to stabilize the exchange rate if δ > 0. In other
7
words, an appreciation of the real exchange rate will require a cut in short-term interest rates.
Even if equation (3) denotes a forward-looking Taylor rule, it has been assumed, as in Bernanke
and Gertler (1999), that only past (once-lagged) stock prices disequilibria aﬀect the instrument
rate, rt. This assumption implies that central banks might intervene only when asset prices
have been observed to deviate from equilibrium, rather than anticipating potential misalignments.
Given our formulation, in order to stabilize asset prices we must have φ > 0. This implies
that whenever asset prices positively (negatively) deviate from their equilibrium level, for example
because of poor regulatory practice or ‘irrational exuberance’ (Shiller, 2000), central bankers will
increase (decrease) the instrument rate in order to oﬀset the anomalous price dynamics.
2.3 A subsidiary issue: the role of output-gap measures
In the previous sub-sections we have discussed how central banks may act setting a target for the
nominal short-term interest rate as a function of the state of the economy, which includes, inter alia,
the output gap. In the empirical literature on central banks’ reaction functions the output gap has
generally been measured by detrending output using quadratic deterministic trends or smoothed
trends representing the equilibrium level of output that would be obtained under perfectly flexible
prices (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997; Baxter and King, 1999, and the references therein). In
practice, the eﬃcient level of output is likely to behave diﬀerently in response to diﬀerent real
shocks (e.g. shocks related to changes in technology, government expenditure plans, productivity
or consumers preferences). As a result the output-gap measure that is relevant for monetary
policy purposes may be diﬀerent from the one captured by detrended output.
A series of recent contributions (see, inter alia, Gali and Gertler, 1999; Gali, Gertler and
Lopez-Salido, 2001) emphasize this point in the context of a structural derivation of the Phillips
curve. They show that under certain restrictions on technology and labor market structure (see
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999) within a local neighborhood of the steady state, real marginal
costs are proportionately related to the output gap. A measure of real marginal costs might
therefore be considered as an appropriate proxy for the output gap (Woodford, 2001).
The most common measure of marginal cost used in the literature is represented by the cost of
increasing labor input. If output is a diﬀerentiable function of the labor input and firms are wage
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takers, then the (real) marginal cost is equal to the (real) wage divided by the marginal product
of labor. More formally, assume for simplicity that the aggregate production function is given by
a Cobb-Douglas specification Yt = AtN
1−α
t , where Yt is aggregate output, Nt is employment at
time t, At is a common technology factor, and 1 > α > 0. The real marginal cost (RMC) can be
defined as:
RMCt =
Wt/Pt
(1− α) (Yt/Nt)
, (5)
where Wt is the nominal wage, and Pt is the aggregate price level. Real marginal costs move over
time according to observed fluctuations in economic activity and employment. Indeed, there is a
large literature supporting the view that marginal costs increase more than prices during expansions
inducing real marginal costs to increase. This is motivated on the basis of two arguments. First,
holding constant other determinants of labor supply, real wages must rise during expansions to
induce more people to work. Second, if one makes the standard assumption that the production
function is concave, for a given level of technology the marginal product of labor is a decreasing
function of labor input (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). This behavior is therefore consistent
with a procyclical dynamics of real marginal costs.
However, variations in real unit labor costs have often been found to be negatively (instead
of positively) correlated with detrended gross domestic product (GDP) - e.g. Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999), Woodford (2001), Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), Sbordone (2002). In
order to shed light on this countercyclical behavior, it is instructive to decompose movements in
real unit labor costs in order to isolate the factors driving this variable. Following Gali, Gertler
and Lopez-Salido (2001), real marginal costs are equal to the measure of distance of output from
its eﬃcient level:
rmct = logµ
w
t + [(ct − ϕnt)− (yt − nt)] , (6)
where ct is consumption, µwt is the gross wage markup and lowercase variables are defined in
logarithms. The expression in brackets [(ct − ϕnt)− (yt − nt)] is the (log-linearized) measure of
distance of output from its eﬃciency level, or, using the Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido’s (2001)
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terminology, the ‘ineﬃciency wedge.’ In equation (6), (ct − ϕnt) is the marginal cost of labor
supply, and ϕ is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply. If we assume for simplicity an
economy with just consumption goods (ct = yt), then we can derive an expression that explicitly
links the ‘ineﬃciency wedge’ to the output gap:
[(ct − ϕnt)− (yt − nt)] = −Θ+ ω (yt − y∗t ) , (7)
where Θ is an indicator of steady state distortions due to the existence of market power in labor
and goods markets, and y∗t is the level of output that would be obtained under perfectly flexible
prices and wages.
The countercyclical behavior of real marginal costs can be explained by using equations (6)-(7)
to obtain:
rmct = logµ
w
t −Θ+ ω (yt − y∗t ) . (8)
Equation (8) tells us that the presence of frictions in the labor market may drive the dynamics
of real marginal costs. In fact, as documented in Woodford (2001) and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-
Salido (2001) and as suggested by equation (8), while the ‘ineﬃciency wedge’ moves closely with the
business cycle over time, the wage markup should behave in a countercyclical fashion, suggesting
the likelihood of temporary wage rigidities. By removing this markup component from real
marginal costs it should be possible to get a representative measure of the output gap which might
be used as an indicator of stabilization.
Figure 1 shows our time series for real unit labor costs after adjusting for wage markup, and
detrended output gap for the US, the UK and Japan. The calculation of the adjusted labor costs
follows exactly our description of the mark-up adjustment given above, assuming, as is standard in
this literature, the labor supply elasticity ϕ = 1 (Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido, 2001, p. 1263).
The graphs in Figure 1 suggest that the prediction of the simple decomposition outlined above is
confirmed, as evidenced by the fact that the adjusted real marginal cost measure appears to be
positively correlated with the business cycle.
We now turn to a description of our data set.
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3 Data
Our data set comprises quarterly time series spanning from September 1979 to December 2000 for
the US, the UK and Japan.4 We use as instruments interest rates the Federal funds rate for the
US, the base rate for the Bank of England, and the call money rate for the Bank of Japan. The
baseline inflation measure is, for all three countries examined, the (annualized) rate of change in
the consumer price index (CPI), although we also report results using the GDP deflator. These
time series are obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics
database.
The baseline output-gap measure is the adjusted labor share calculated as in Gali, Gertler
and Lopez-Salido (2001, p. 1263). The data on consumption per household, employment per
household, real wage and labor productivity have been calculated using data from the OECD
Quarterly National Accounts and OECD Quarterly Labor Force Statistics.5 Results are also
reported for alternative measures of the output gap, taken as the quadratically-detrended and
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrended GDP respectively.
The measure of stock prices disequilibrium in the baseline estimation is the dividend-price
ratio calculated using Datastream composite stock price indices for each country examined.6 The
measure of real exchange rate is the log-real eﬀective exchange rate, obtained for each country
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database.
The instrument set includes lags of the instrument rate, inflation, output gap, as well as the
same number of lags of a world commodity price index and the spreads between the respective
long-term bond rate and the short-term bill rate. These time series are also obtained from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database.
4We decided to use this sample period because, as documented in previous contributions, there is evidence of
structural instability in monetary policy reaction functions when using pre-1979 data (see Clarida, Gali and Gertler,
1998).
5For further details, see the relevant discussion in Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001), which we followed
closely in the construction of our time series.
6A robustness exercise was carried out using measures based on the S&P 500 index for the US, the FTSE100
index for the UK and the NIKKEI 225 index for Japan (see Section 4.3).
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4 Empirical results
In this section we report our main empirical results from estimating both standard forward-looking
Taylor rules as well as augmented forward-looking Taylor rules which also allow for exchange
rates and asset prices to enter the central bank’s reaction function. We then report a battery of
robustness checks and provide a discussion of the alternative potential explanations of our findings.
4.1 Forward-looking Taylor rules
Table 1 reports GMM estimates of the interest rate rule parameters
neβ, eγ,eρo in a standard forward-
looking Taylor rule for each of the US, the UK and Japan. We begin with an interest rate rule -
equation (2) - where only expected inflation and expected output gap are considered as explanatory
variables, also experimenting with various measures of these two arguments. Following previous
research (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998, 2000), we consider a specification of the interest rate
rule with two lags of the interest rate for the US and only one lag for the UK and Japan. We allow
for a maximum of four lags of the variables in the instrument set. The first four specifications
we estimate consider two measures of inflation, namely the CPI and the GDP deflator, and two
conventional measures of the output gap, namely quadratically- and HP-detrended GDP.
The estimation results reported in Table 1 (specifications 1 to 4) yield parameters values that
are consistent with the results recorded in the literature (e.g. see Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998,
2000). In particular, for the US, for each specification considered, the estimate of β is always
correctly signed, strongly statistically significant and greater than unity, while the estimate of γ is
not statistically diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels of significance (see Panel a) of Table 1).
In turn, this implies that the Federal Reserve has responded only to deviations of expected inflation
from the implicit inflation target, not to the expected output gap, over the sample examined. For
the UK (see Panel b) of Table 1), the estimate of β is also correctly signed and strongly statistically
significant for each of specifications 1 to 4; the estimated β is only slightly greater than unity and
generally lower than for the US reaction function. Estimates of γ obtained using the HP-detrended
GDP series are not statistically significant at conventional significance levels (see Kozicki, 1999).
For Japan (see Panel c) of Table 1), the estimate of β is again correctly signed and significant,
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and its size is somewhere in between the estimates for the UK and the ones of the US reaction
function. Estimates of γ are statistically significant but very small in magnitude. Also, for all of
these specifications and for each country, the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected and
hence the Hansen test supports the validity of the instrument set used.
The last four specifications in Panels a) to c) of Table 1 show the results from estimating the
forward-looking Taylor rule with arguments in expected inflation and output gap where the relevant
measure of the output gap is given by a proxy of real marginal costs. Woodford (2001) argues
that this output-gap measure may be more appropriate in this context. Specifications 5 and 6 are
estimated using the real marginal cost as a proxy for the output gap, while specifications 7 and 8
consider the real marginal cost adjusted for the wage markup, following the procedure described
in Section 2.3. The parameters estimates yield, also in this case, fairly clear results. Whenever
we consider real unit labor cost into the interest rate rule, the estimated parameter γ is found
to be statistically significant for each country examined, but with the wrong sign. This finding
can be heuristically explained by the documented evidence of negative correlation between general
measures of output gap and real marginal costs (see, inter alia, Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido,
2001; Woodford, 2001).
Specifications 7 and 8 are estimated using real marginal costs adjusted for wage markup. As
discussed in Section 2.3, this correction circumvents the problem of the negative correlation between
real marginal costs and the business cycle. Interestingly, using this measure of real marginal
costs, the estimated parameter γ is, for each country, correctly signed (positive) and statistically
significant, providing evidence in favor of the adjusted real marginal costs measure (Woodford,
2001).
4.2 An augmented forward-looking Taylor rule
Next, we estimate the interest rate rule parameters
neβ, eγ, eφ,eδ,eρo for the US and the UK in
an augmented forward-looking Taylor rule of the form (3) using CPI inflation and the adjusted
real marginal costs as proxies for inflation and output gap respectively, and using the dividend-
price ratio and the real eﬀective exchange rate as proxies for stock market and exchange rates
disequilibria respectively. The target horizon for the forward-looking variables is assumed to be
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one quarter for both inflation and the output gap (i.e. kπ = ky = 1 in equation (3)).
The results of the GMM estimation of equation (3), reported in Table 2, produce estimates of
the parameters that are all statistically significant and exhibit the expected sign for both the US
and the UK. For Japan, the only insignificant parameter is the one associated with asset prices.
More precisely, the estimated parameters φ and δ, associated with asset prices and exchange
rates disequilibria respectively, are positive for each country examined, although they are small
in absolute value. Interestingly, δ is always statistically significant for each country and φ is
statistically significant for the US and the UK but insignificantly diﬀerent from zero for Japan.7
Further the large p-values of the test for overidentifying restrictions suggest that the instrument
set used is valid.
The results in Table 2 also confirm the presence of interest rate inertia (detected in all of our
previous specifications and well documented in the relevant literature), as captured by the lagged
values of interest rates in equation (3). These findings support the view that the Federal Reserve,
the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan smooth the adjustment of interest rates towards their
target values (see, inter alia, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000; Eijﬃnger and Huizinga, 2000).
Some recent contributions point out that monetary policy rules estimated over long sample
periods may be aﬀected by parameter instability (see, inter alia, Oliner, Rudebusch and Sichel,
1996; Rudebusch, 1998, 2001). In order to test for parameter instability, we carried out a
Hansen (1992) test for the null hypothesis of parameter stability, applied individually to each
of the estimated parameters reported in Table 2. The results, reported in square brackets in
Table 2, show that for each country examined the null hypothesis of parameter stability cannot be
rejected at conventional statistical significance levels.
Before discussing and further interpreting our empirical results, we report some robustness
checks carried out on our baseline estimation results.
7As discussed in our robustness section below, these findings hold up when using diﬀerent measures of asset
prices disequilibria; see Section 4.3.
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4.3 Robustness
In order to investigate the robustness of the results in Table 2, we re-estimated equation (3)
using alternative measures of inflation, asset prices disequilibria and alternative target horizons
for each of the forward-looking variables. As discussed below, in each country and over diﬀerent
specifications, this robustness analysis confirms, at least in a qualitative sense, the findings of our
baseline estimates reported in Table 2. Using a diﬀerent measure of inflation based on the GDP
deflator (see Specification 1 of Table 3), the estimated parameters are not qualitatively diﬀerent
from the estimates recorded in Table 2.
In the baseline results discussed in the previous subsection, we assumed that the central banks
examined have a one-quarter horizon for each of the forward-looking variables (inflation and output-
gap). We examine the robustness of our results to this particular assumption. In particular, we
consider in turn the cases in which central banks have a target horizon of up to one year for inflation
and up to two quarters for the output gap. This is the horizon often referred to as appropriate
in describing the lag with which monetary policy aﬀects the target variables (see Bernanke and
Mihov, 1998; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000). The results from estimating equation (3) using
these diﬀerent horizons for the forward-looking variables are reported as Specifications 2-5 in
Table 3. These results suggest that, while the estimates of γ, δ, φ are virtually unaﬀected, the
magnitude of β changes. However, the diﬀerences across specifications are not marked since the
new estimates are always located in the confidence intervals implied by the standard errors of the
parameters estimated in previous specifications.
Next we check for robustness the statistical significance of the parameter in the monetary
policy rule associated with asset prices, using two diﬀerent measures of asset prices disequilibria.
First we employ a permanent-transitory decomposition as in Cochrane (1994) in order to retrieve
transitory deviations from the equilibrium asset price level. Second, following Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), we employ lags of the log-diﬀerences in asset prices. As we can see in Table 3
(Specifications 6 and 7), the estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our baseline
estimates confirming that for each country the coeﬃcient in the monetary policy rules associated
with asset prices disequilibria are small in absolute value but statistically significant at conventional
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statistical levels.8
Overall, the robustness checks reported here suggest that our baseline estimates given in Table
2 appear to be fairly robust to changes in the proxy for inflation, asset prices disequilibria, and
to the choice of the horizon over which the central bank forms expectations of inflation and the
output gap for the purpose of implementing monetary policy.
4.4 Discussion
The results of our baseline estimation reported in Table 2 deserve further discussion. To aid our
discussion, in Figure 2 we report, for each country examined, the actual value and the estimated
target value of the instrument rates implied by Specification 1 in Table 1 and by our baseline
estimation reported in Table 2. The target value diﬀers from the fitted value in that the latter
incorporates the interest rate smoothing parameters and the former implicitly sets these parameters
to zero (as in equation (1)).
The interest rates implied by the estimated rules characterize well the behavior of the
instrument rates. Upon examination of Figure 2, we find that the two diﬀerent specifications (i.e.
the standard forward-looking Taylor rule and the augmented forward-looking Taylor rule which
allows for both exchange rates and asset prices) are both satisfactory in tracing the dynamics of
the instrument rates. Indeed, this simple visual analysis of the models’ target predictions suggests
that the contribution of the two additional variables allowed for - asset prices and exchange rates
disequilibria - is not suﬃcient to distinguish clearly between the two specifications.
However, looking at Figure 3, where the contribution in percentage terms of each explanatory
variable to the target value is shown, provides more insightful information. The graphs in Figure
3 suggest that, even if the level of the implied instrument rate target is very similar to the one
implied by the standard forward-looking Taylor rule, the contribution of the diﬀerent explanatory
variables to its determination is diﬀerent. In each country, central banks set up their targets mainly
according to inflation dynamics. However, the other explanatory variables in the augmented policy
8We also executed the same robustness exercise using the S&P500, FTSE100 and NIKKEI 225 indices for the
US, the UK and Japan respectively over a shorter sample period (because of data availability). In addition, we
checked whether having asset prices and exchange rates enter the augmented policy rule contemporaneously made
a diﬀerence. The results, not reported, are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones reported in Tables
2-3.
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rule also make some contribution to the instrument rate target determination.
At face value these results may suggest that the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England use
asset prices and exchange rates as targets and the Bank of Japan targets exchange rates, implying
that they attempt to stabilize these variables in much the same way as they stabilize inflation or
output. However, central bankers have often been clear that they do not target asset prices, either
because asset prices are not necessarily related to the objectives of monetary policy or because they
are only important insofar as they provide information about expected inflation. Alternatively, it
could be that targeting asset prices is very diﬃcult in practice given the diﬃculty of establishing
their true equilibrium values (e.g. see Gertler, Goodfriend, Issing and Spaventa, 1999, and the
references therein).
Nevertheless, several heuristic explanations can be used to justify our findings, which we present
below. First, central banks may lie because there may be gains from secrecy. They might target
asset prices and exchange rates but they do not want to admit it - e.g. see the case of foreign
exchange intervention operations, which are often secret even though standard theory suggests
that oﬃcial intervention in the foreign exchange market is (more) eﬀective if it is announced (e.g.
Sarno and Taylor, 2001).9
Second, asset prices that have explanatory power in characterizing interest rate changes are only
a proxy for that part of expected inflation and output which is not explained by the instruments
used in the GMM estimation. Asset prices play a role in helping to get closer to the central banks
forecasting information set. The main implication of this conjecture is that central banks do not
target asset prices per se but they use them as good information variables (e.g. Clarida, 2001).
Third, central banks stabilize asset prices because they provide some information for aggregate
price and output determination outside of their impact on firms’ cost schedules. In other words,
if asset prices only reflect the expected profit stream that accrues to firms who employ capital
and labor at their rental prices and maximize profits subject to marginal costs, then asset prices
are irrelevant. However, if asset prices diverge from this path and send incorrect signals to the
corporate sector, there may be a prima facie case for oﬀsetting this signal.
Finally, under a diﬀerent perspective, our findings can be justified by the fact that what we are
9See also the related arguments put forth by Carare and Stone (2003).
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depicting in our estimation as a systematic rule may be, in fact, driven by occasional discretionary
policy aiming, for example, at curbing bubbles or large misalignments in asset prices and exchange
rates. This interpretation finds some support by looking at Figure 3. This figure suggests that asset
prices and exchange rates disequilibria are particularly important in determining the interest rate
target at times that are easily recognizable as large misalignments. For example, they are clearly
recognizable for the US, the period following the 1987 crash of the stock price bubble, the dot-com
bubble in the mid to late 1990s, and the appreciation of the dollar in the mid 1980s. For the UK,
one could claim that asset prices disequilibria have hardly been economically important, while
exchange rates disequilibria have been particularly important in the period around the sterling
devaluation of 1992 that characterized the exit of the UK from the Exchange Rate Mechanism,
and the protracted sterling appreciation of the mid to late 1990s. For Japan, exchange rates were
largely unimportant until 1986 or so, when they became important for some time, and then in the
early to mid 1990s, consistent with the results reported by Jinushi, Kuroki and Miyao (2000) and
McKinnon and Schnabl (2003).
Overall, it seems to us fair to conclude that, while both asset prices and exchange rates
disequilibria are statistically significant in forward-looking Taylor rules, the evidence provided
in this section suggests that, although these variables may not be key for systematic monetary
policy, they induce a response from central banks when misalignments are relatively large.10
5 Conclusions
We have examined the relationship between short-term interest rates, macroeconomic fundamentals
and asset prices and exchange rates in order to estimate monetary policy rules using quarterly data
for the 1979-2000 period for the US, the UK and Japan. In particular, we have not only limited
10Our interpretation that the reaction of central banks to asset prices and exchange rates disequilibria may depend
on the size of the disequilibria themselves suggests that a nonlinear characterization of interest rate rules may be a
logical extension of our research. The possibility of a nonlinear reaction function can also be rationalized on the
theoretical work of Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and is indeed suggested by the earlier work on escape clauses of Flood
and Isard (1989). However, a nonlinear generalization is not straightforward in this context since the reaction
function would be partly linear - in expected inflation and output gap - and partly nonlinear - in asset prices and
exchange rates. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no GMM or instrumental variables estimator exists to date
for models of this kind (or indeed for any multivariate threshold model), which makes estimation and statistical
inference especially cumbersome in this context.
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our analysis to the eﬀects of inflation and output disequilibria on the setting of short-term interest
rates, but we have explicitly considered the eﬀects of asset prices and exchange rates disequilibria.
Further, a subsidiary issue investigated is the extent to which the output gap is correctly measured
in this context. Following the argument that the output-gap measure relevant for monetary policy
purposes may be diﬀerent from the one represented by detrended output (Woodford, 2001), we
employed in our analysis real marginal costs as a proxy for the output gap.
By estimating monetary policy rules for each of the US, the UK and Japan we find results
which provide some evidence in favor of the conjecture that central banks respond to shifts in real
marginal costs, rather than to any shock causing deviations of output from its trend. Further, in
contrast with previous literature, we find that the parameters in the monetary rules associated with
asset prices and exchange rates disequilibria are statistically significant, yet small, for each of the
US and the UK, and exchange rates enter significantly the monetary policy reaction function for
Japan. However, our results seem to suggest that asset prices and exchange rates may not be key
for systematic monetary policy, albeit representing an important aspect of monetary policy design.
In other words, we view our empirical results as suggesting that, in consideration of the risks that
large misalignments in asset markets pose to macroeconomic stability and to the soundness of
the financial sector, while targeting asset prices and exchange rates has not been a policy goal
pursued systematically by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan, these
major central banks have reacted to these variables on a few occasions during the sample. More
precisely, this is consistent with the view that, while committed to running monetary policy to
keep inflationary pressures under control and to bring output growth in line with potential, major
central banks do act in response to exchange rates or asset prices on occasions when there is a
need to prevent an abrupt correction in asset markets that could be destabilizing for the economy.
Although our baseline results have been shown to be robust to diﬀerent specifications and
proxy variables, several caveats are in order. Throughout the paper, the estimation of monetary
policy rules has been carried out by means of the Generalized Method of Moments. The clear
non-rejection of the null hypothesis of a valid instrument set in all our estimations, however, does
not rule out the possibility that monetary rules may be misspecified. In particular, it might be
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the case that the weights assigned to diﬀerent targets may be linked in a nonlinear fashion to
the arguments in the reaction function, which would be in contrast with the implicit assumption
of linearity maintained in conventional forward-looking monetary policy rules. Indeed, if our
interpretation that asset prices and exchange rates are economically important in central banks’s
reaction functions when they are substantially misaligned from their fundamental equilibrium
values, then a logical extension of this research involves using nonlinear reaction functions which
may explicitly capture this behavior (e.g. see Bordo and Jeanne, 2002, for a theoretical rationale
of nonlinearity in this context). Investigation of these issues remains on the agenda for future
research.
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Table 1. Standard forward-looking Taylor rule: the role of the output gap
Panel a) United States
eβ eγ eρ J-test
1. πt = πCPIt , xt = x
Q
t 1.688 0.021 0.827 0.253
(0.591) (0.328) (0.267)
2. πt = πCPIt , xt = x
HP
t 1.764 0.624 0.816 0.192
(0.456) (1.887) (0.285)
3. πt = πGDPt , xt = x
Q
t 1.720 -0.021 0.746 0.394
(0.426) (0.211) (0.257)
4. πt = πGDPt , xt = x
HP
t 1.582 -1.169 0.663 0.998
(0.324) (2.943) (0.215)
5. πt = πCPIt , xt = LSt 1.925 -0.855 0.851 0.085
(0.285) (0.332) (0.08)
6. πt = πGDPt , xt = LSt 2.036 -0.723 -0.830 0.258
(0.125) (0.143) (0.05)
7. πt = πCPIt , xt = cLSt 2.205 0.869 0.852 0.471
(0.267) (0.387) (0.126)
8. πt = πGDPt , xt = cLSt 2.392 1.073 0.844 0.714
(0.389) (0.492) (0.228)
Panel b) United Kingdom
eβ eγ eρ J-test
1. πt = πCPIt , xt = x
Q
t 1.039 0.241 0.786 0.067
(0.203) (0.185) (0.038)
2. πt = πCPIt , xt = x
HP
t 0.984 0.232 0.906 0.412
(0.155) (1.653) (0.017)
3. πt = πGDPt , xt = x
Q
t 1.054 0.315 0.738 0.079
(0.228) (0.208) (0.097)
4. πt = πGDPt , xt = x
HP
t 1.019 0.360 0.814 0.354
(0.253) (1.518) (0.071)
5. πt = πCPIt , xt = LSt 1.457 -0.586 0.790 0.117
(0.459) (0.299) (0.026)
6. πt = πGDPt , xt = LSt 1.271 -0.613 0.846 0.163
(0.124) (0.281) (0.024)
7. πt = πCPIt , xt = cLSt 1.086 0.448 0.894 0.999
(0.100) (0.174) (0.007)
8. πt = πGDPt , xt = cLSt 1.208 0.596 0.866 0.999
(0.080) (0.213) (0.012)
(continued ...)
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(... Table 1 continued)
Panel c) Japan
eβ eγ eρ J-test
1. πt = πCPIt , xt = x
Q
t 1.737 0.050 0.972 0.991
(0.259) (0.020) (0.003)
2. πt = πCPIt , xt = x
HP
t 1.504 0.025 0.970 0.986
(0.182) (0.008) (0.003)
3. πt = πGDPt , xt = x
Q
t 1.328 0.005 0.892 0.853
(0.174) (0.001) (0.028)
4. πt = πGDPt , xt = x
HP
t 1.102 0.014 0.963 0.993
(0.082) (0.005) (0.003)
5. πt = πCPIt , xt = LSt 1.473 -0.023 0.903 0.998
(0.549) (0.006) (0.035)
6. πt = πGDPt , xt = LSt 1.259 -0.009 0.850 0.769
(0.196) (0.003) (0.029)
7. πt = πCPIt , xt = cLSt 2.366 0.034 0.946 0.828
(0.389) (0.015) (0.019)
8. πt = πGDPt , xt = cLSt 1.854 0.018 0.877 0.921
(0.186) (0.008) (0.037)
Notes: The estimated parameters refer to equation (2). The interest rates target used are the
Federal funds rate, the Bank of England base rate and the call money rate for Japan respectively.
The sample period is September 1979-December 2000. The instruments set includes a constant,
lagged output gap, inflation, the interest rate and the log-diﬀerence of a world commodity price
index. Estimates are obtained by GMM with a correction for moving average autocorrelation
obtained by two-step nonlinear two-stage least square (Hansen, 1982). The optimal weighting
matrix obtained from first step two-stages least square parameter estimates. πCPIt and π
GDP
t are
inflation rates measured using the CPI and GDP deflator respectively. xQt and x
HP
t are measures
of the output gap (calculated over the period 1960-2000) obtained by means of quadratic-trend
regression and Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter set to 1, 600) respectively. LSt andcLSt are the labor share (calculated as in the text) and the labor share adjusted for the wage
markup respectively. J-test is the test for overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982), which is
distributed as χ2 under the null. For this test only p−values are reported. eρ denotes the sum
of the autoregressive parameters associated with the lagged interest rate instrument. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2. Augmented forward-looking Taylor rule: baseline estimates
eβ eγ eδ eφ eρ J-test
United States 1.252 0.719 0.073 0.015 0.767 0.935
(0.195) (0.229) (0.009) (0.005) (0.040)
[0.246] [0.192] [0.221] [0.188] [0.147]
United Kingdom 1.034 0.542 0.056 0.007 0.889 0.999
(0.026) (0.037) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
[0.160] [0.104] [0.175] [0.173] [0.136]
Japan 1.115 0.013 0.002 0.0002 0.895 0.745
(0.440) (0.003) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.034)
[0.122] [0.386] [0.160] [0.179] [0.332]
Notes: See Notes to Table 1. The estimated parameters refer to equation (3). The sample
period is September 1979-December 2000. The baseline specification was estimated using the
CPI to measure inflation and the adjusted labor share to measure the output gap. The forward
looking horizon for inflation and the output gap is one quarter (kπ = 1, kx = 1). The instruments
set includes a constant plus four lags of output gap, inflation, the interest rate, log diﬀerence of
a world commodity price index, real eﬀective exchange rate and dividend-price ratio. Values in
brackets are p-values from executing the Hansen (1992) test statistic for the null hypothesis of
parameter stability.
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Table 3. Augmented forward-looking Taylor rule: robustness analysis
Panel a) United States
eβ eγ eδ eφ eρ J-test
1. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 1, kx = 1 1.226 0.817 0.065 0.011 0.721 0.961
(0.209) (0.135) (0.010) (0.005) (0.069)
2. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 4, kx = 1 1.289 0.981 0.075 0.017 0.785 0.946
(0.215) (0.337) (0.013) (0.007) (0.064)
3. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 4, kx = 1 1.562 0.824 0.064 0.008 0.719 0.935
(0.267) (0.385) (0.014) (0.004) (0.078)
4. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 4, kx = 2 1.048 0.907 0.049 0.022 0.788 0.995
(0.210) (0.278) (0.017) (0.006) (0.069)
5. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 4, kx = 2 1.752 0.890 0.046 0.008 0.779 0.999
(0.116) (0.109) (0.005) (0.004) (0.042)
6. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 1, kx = 1, st = s
C
t 2.035 0.796 0.076 0.037 0.765 0.994
(0.049) (0.106) (0.008) (0.015) (0.052)
7. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 1, kx = 1, st = s
BG
t 1.561 0.593 0.081 0.036 0.822 0.999
(0.099) (0.139) (0.009) (0.019) (0.037)
Panel b) United Kingdom
eβ eγ eδ eφ eρ J-test
1. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 1, kx = 1 0.925 0.778 0.075 0.008 0.886 0.998
(0.013) (0.040) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
2. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 4, kx = 1 1.439 0.423 0.098 0.007 0.892 0.867
(0.211) (0.09) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004)
3. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 4, kx = 1 1.553 0.462 0.034 0.006 0.813 0.913
(0.388) (0.014) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
4. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 4, kx = 2 1.462 0.284 0.036 0.009 0.863 0.999
(0.343) (0.046) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
5. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 4, kx = 2 1.531 0.269 0.032 0.011 0.816 0.905
(0.355) (0.017) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
6. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 1, kx = 1, st = s
C
t 1.041 0.535 0.064 0.023 0.891 0.999
(0.020) (0.034) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
7. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 1, kx = 1, st = s
BG
t 1.079 0.713 0.028 0.018 0.903 0.998
(0.044) (0.093) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003)
(continued ...)
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(... Table 3 continued)
Panel c) Japan
eβ eγ eδ eφ eρ J-test
1. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 1, kx = 1 1.094 0.014 0.0012 0.0001 0.901 0.811
(0.434) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.051)
2. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 4, kx = 1 1.378 0.012 0.0015 0.0001 0.940 0.751
(0.541) (0.002) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.049)
3. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 4, kx = 1 1.548 0.011 0.003 0.0001 0.859 0.765
(0.543) (0.002) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.058)
4. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 4, kx = 2 1.277 0.010 0.007 0.0002 0.926 0.825
(0.374) (0.002) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.051)
5. πt = πGDPt , kπ = 4, kx = 2 1.670 0.010 0.007 0.0001 0.894 0.788
(0.318) (0.001) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.032)
6. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 1, kx = 1, st = s
C
t 1.564 0.012 0.0012 0.0003 0.928 0.825
(0.227) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.038)
7. πt = πCPIt , kπ = 1, kx = 1, st = s
BG
t 1.343 0.011 0.009 0.0003 0.967 0.827
(0.441) (0.001) (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.029)
Notes: See Notes to Table 1. The estimated parameters refer to equation (3). kπ and kx
denotes the forward looking horizon for inflation and the output gap respectively. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. sCt denotes the transitory component calculated as in Cochrane (1994)
using Datastream stock price indices. sBGt denotes the log-diﬀerenced changes in the Datastream
stock price indices (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1999); under sBGt , six lags of the log-diﬀerences in
the stock prices have been used.
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 Figure 2.  Interest rates: actual and target
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